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Regulation of Subprime and Predatory Lending

To understand the regulation of subprime and predatory lending, one must first
understand the rapid growth and subsequent implosion of the subprime mortgage market.
1. The Subprime Mortgage Market
The development of the subprime mortgage market in the 1990s coincided with a
dramatic departure from the typical process of obtaining a mortgage prior to that time.
Previously, Americans who wanted to purchase a home would often walk into a local
savings bank and speak to an officer who would evaluate their application. Depending
on income, wealth and ties to the community, the loan officer might approve a loan.
Typically only those with a healthy, or “prime,” profile were approved. This profile
usually reflected a steady work history, a large down-payment and no problems with
credit.
Thrifts, including savings banks, savings and loans and mutual savings banks,
were not only the dominant type of lender, but they also vertically dominated the
residential mortgage market. They serviced the mortgages that they originated and
typically held them until they were paid off by the borrowers. Now, technological,
financial and legal innovations allow global finance companies to offer a range of
mortgage products to a broad array of potential residential borrowers. These same
innovations have also led to increased specialization.
As a result, there has been a fracturing of the mortgage industry. Since the 1990s,
it is common for a given mortgage to be originated by a mortgage broker contacted by
telephone; serviced by a mortgage banker; insured by a mortgage insurance company;
legally owned by a trust; and beneficially owned by an institutional investor.
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“Subprime” lending became a very significant portion of this type of mortgage
activity. Subprime lending is the extension of credit to those with lower incomes, less
wealth and riskier credit profiles than traditional, “prime,” borrowers. Subprime lending
extended credit to people who not have received it in the past. A negative consequence
of the change in the residential mortgage industry away from dominance by thrifts and
toward relatively unregulated specialty firms has resulted in a variety of abuses in the
subprime market.
Subprime lenders typically offered two types of products to borrowers. First, they
offer refinance and purchase mortgages to borrowers with poor credit histories. In many
cases, borrowers refinance mortgages for an amount greater than the balance of the
original mortgage, thereby taking “cash out” of their homes. Second, they offer “Alt-A”
mortgages to borrowers with FICO scores similar to those found in the prime market.
Alt-A mortgages are typically made to borrowers who cannot document all of the
information in their loan application (“low doc” or “no-doc” loans, some of which are
referred to as “liar loans” or “no income no asset loans”). Alt-A mortgages can be used
either for purchases or refinances. Subprime loans have higher interest rates than prime
loans, a fact that lenders ascribe to the subprime borrowers’ greater risk of default
although this is not always the case as many prime borrowers had been steered into
subprime mortgages.
Most subprime loans were originated by mortgage and consumer finance
companies, with a smaller amount issued by banks and thrifts. And most of them are
used for the refinancing of existing mortgages. The growth of subprime lending had been
utterly explosive. The secondary market provides much of the liquidity and capacity for
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this extraordinary growth for the subprime market. From making up a tiny portion of
new mortgage originations in the early 1990s, subprime mortgages made up 40 percent of
newly originated securitized mortgages in 2006. Beginning in 2006, mortgage default
and delinquency rates began to rise. Nonetheless, subprime lenders kept lending.
Lenders made loans on very easy terms, at least for initial teaser periods, to borrowers
with poor credit, low income and low assets. By 2007, the subprime market began to
look disastrous as a wave of foreclosures quickly built and swept across the nation. The
subprime boom had gone bust, taking the rest of the credit markets with it.
The best that can be said for the subprime boom is that it allowed many people to
access the equity in their homes who would not have otherwise been able to do so. This
greater access to credit in the subprime market came at the cost of significantly higher
fees and interest rates than a prime borrower would face. It also came at the cost of
significantly higher fees and interest rates for minority borrowers as compared to white
borrowers, and these higher costs were not efficiently related to the comparative credit
risk of white and minority borrowers. In other words, the subprime market in the
aggregate appeared to discriminate to some extent against communities of color. And it
also came at the cost of enticing many borrowers to take out loans that were
extraordinarily inappropriate for them, given the low likelihood that they would be able
to repay them.
The subprime market is far less regulated and standardized than the prime market.
As such, it presents an opportunity for those seeking to separate financially
unsophisticated borrowers from the equity that they have built up in their homes. That is,
it presents an opportunity to engage in predatory lending. Most predatory behavior takes
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place between a mortgage broker or mortgage banker on the one hand and the borrower
on the other. But such thinly funded entities could not exist without funding from
secondary market investors.
Predatory lending is far more common in the “refinance” or “home equity”
market than in the home purchase market because home equity borrowers have much
more equity in their home than purchasers: the existing home equity gives predatory
lenders a greater opportunity to pack a refinanced loan with excessive fees that might not
be readily identifiable by the borrower.
While there is no generally accepted comprehensive definition of predatory
lending, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) has cobbled together a good
working description: predatory lending is “an umbrella term that is generally used to
describe cases in which a broker or originating lender takes unfair advantage of a
borrower, often through deception, fraud, or manipulation, to make a loan that contains
terms that are disadvantageous to the borrower.” Accordingly, the GAO has defined
predatory lending to include the following abusive practices and loan terms: (1)
excessive fees; (2) excessive interest rates; (3) single-premium credit insurance; (4)
lending without regard to ability to repay (also known as equity-based lending, where a
lender should know that a borrower is unlikely to be able to keep up with the monthly
payments); (5) loan flipping (repeated, costly refinancing in a short period of time
without any economic gain for the borrower); (6) fraud and deception; (7) prepayment
penalties (fees or finance charges that become payable when consumers repay principal
faster than scheduled); and (8) balloon payments (large payments of principal due at the
end of a loan term).
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Predatory practices are not typically present in the prime market. And not all
subprime loans are predatory. But predatory practices were found throughout the
subprime market, where low- and moderate-income borrowers are concentrated. They
are used to prey on unsophisticated homeowners, typically those who are not integrated
in the sphere of mainstream financial institutions such as banks and credit unions.
The holder in due course doctrine severely limits the remedies available to victims
of predatory lending. This is because the holder in due course doctrine protects the
ultimate funders of predatory practices, secondary market investors who purchase
mortgage notes. The holder in due course doctrine immunizes them, as good faith
purchasers, from liability for many types of fraud perpetrated by the originator of a loan.
The net result of the application of the doctrine is that a borrower who has been the
victim of a fraud not only cannot be compensated for the harm caused by the fraud, but
even more, cannot assert the existence of the fraud as a defense against payment on the
mortgage note nor as a defense in a foreclosure proceeding.
Consider the following example: a borrower receives a predatory home equity
loan from a mortgage broker who then immediately sells the loan to an investor on the
secondary market. If that investor can be shown to be a holder in due course (and the
loan is not covered by the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994 nor
certain state statutes, as discussed below), then the borrower will not be able to hold
anyone other than the originator responsible for many abusive practices. And because the
originator is likely to be an undercapitalized mortgage broker or banker, the borrower is
left with no real remedy at all.
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2. Potential Remedies
All that protects homeowners from abusive lenders and unreasonable terms are
market forces and a skimpy patchwork of legislation and regulation. This regulatory
environment has provided insufficient protection to homeowners, a fact made all too
clear by the foreclosure crisis that commenced in 2007.
Most federal legislation, relying on the expectation that markets will self-correct
with time, has done little more than require additional disclosures to be made by the
lender for most subprime loans. Academic research has, however, challenged disclosure
as an effective intervention for consumers operating in the complex and ever-changing
world of mortgage lending.
Even The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, the most
aggressive of the federal statutes, has offered little protection as subprime lenders can
easily avoid its reach. And when states sought to increase consumer protections for their
residents, the Bush Administration preempted many of them, leaving homeowners to rely
upon federal disclosure requirements and a few other modest protections. Beginning in
2008, the Federal Government has signaled that it is more open to increasing consumer
protection in the residential mortgage industry.
Opponents of increased consumer protection regulation argue that such regulation
is paternalistic and that the market will correct itself. The power of such arguments
waxes and wanes with the fortunes of the housing market; the housing bust has led to as
severe decline in their influence.
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3. Federal Legislation
As noted above, federal law does not provide much in the way of protection for
mortgage borrowers. The Truth in Lending Act requires certain material lender
disclosures to a borrower in connection with the origination of a home loan. The Real
Estate Settlement Procedures Act was enacted to protect consumers from unnecessarily
high settlement charges and certain other abusive practices that had developed in the
residential real estate industry. The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act, an
amendment to TILA, places direct limits on certain practices if made in connection with
“high cost loans.” Unfortunately, none of these statutes present much of an impediment
to abusive lenders.
Congress enacted the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) in 1968 as an effort to
guarantee the accurate and meaningful disclosure of the costs of consumer credit and
thereby enable consumers to make informed choices in the credit marketplace. Aimed at
giving consumers a way to understand how much their loans would really cost, the act is
primarily a disclosure statute compelling creditors who extend credit to consumers to
disclose costs using a standardized format and terminology. TILA requires that before a
loan can be originated the lender must provide the borrower with loan terms such as the
Annual Percentage Rate (or APR, a standardized measurement of a lender’s rate of return
based on the finance charges such as interest rate, points and fees relating to the loan).
TILA also includes some other forms of consumer protection, most notably a three-day
period to rescind or cancel all transactions in which a creditor receives a security interest
in the borrower’s home, the so-called “cooling off” period. In a limited number of
circumstances, TILA abrogates the holder in due course doctrine.
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The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) of 1974 prescribes how
settlement services for residential real estate loan transactions are provided and
compensated. RESPA also requires disclosure of settlement costs before the home loan
agreement is signed, ideally enabling the borrower to make an informed decision as to
whether the terms are acceptable and reasonable.
The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994 (HOEPA) was enacted
as an amendment to TILA and appears, at first glance, to provide more significant
protection to homeowners than TILA and RESPA. HOEPA applies to closed-end loans
(one-time, large financings, such as purchase money mortgages that have repayment
plans fixed in both amount and number of payments) that exceed either a (i) high APR or
(ii) points and fees trigger designated by the act. These loans are referred to as “HEOPA
loans.” HOEPA only protects home equity or refinancing loans and does not cover
purchase-money loans or loans to finance the construction of a home. Once triggered,
HOEPA requires additional disclosures; limits certain contract terms; prohibits
potentially abusive acts and practices; and prescribes tough civil remedies for violation of
the act.
HOEPA’s APR trigger is determined by comparing the interest rate for the loan
with the interest rates on treasury securities with comparable maturities. If the interest
rate of a loan exceeds by more than eight percentage points comparable securities, then
HOEPA is triggered. For example, if the comparable treasury securities are at 5% and
the interest rate of a closed-end home equity loan entered is higher than 13%, then that
loan would be a HOEPA loan, subject to the additional consumer protections of HOEPA.
Similarly, HOEPA regulates loans with excessive fees and points. If a lender
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charges points and fees in excess of eight percentage points (with a minimum of $400) of
the total loan amount, then a closed-end home equity loan will be regulated by HOEPA.
This means, for example, that a mortgage with a total loan amount of $100,000 must
have fees of $8,000 or less to avoid being regulated by HOEPA.
HOEPA loans require greater disclosure and are subject to certain prohibitions
designed to prevent some predatory lending practices targeted at vulnerable consumers.
At least three business days before the loan closing, the borrower of a HOEPA loan
should receive a statement disclosing the APR and the monthly payment, as well as
warnings about the risks of entering into a high cost home equity loan. The disclosure
may also contain additional information, depending on the type of loan.
HOEPA also restricts certain loan terms, such as prepayment penalties; interest
rate increases upon default; balloon payments; negative amortization (resulting from
scheduled payments that are insufficient to cover interest due on the loan); and prepaid
payments (withheld from the loan proceeds at closing). HOEPA also limits a lender’s
ability to originate loans underwritten without regard to the borrower’s ability to pay.
The holder in due course doctrine is abrogated for HOEPA loans.
HOEPA did not successfully addressed abusive lending in the subprime sector
because its coverage is limited to a small portion of residential mortgages and lenders can
continue to originate extremely abusive loans without triggering HOEPA protections.
Indeed, it has been estimated that as few as 1-5% of loans originated since HOEPA’s
enactment have fallen under its protection. HOEPA’s protections can most easily be
circumvented by either converting products from closed-end to open-end (revolving
credit in which debtor and creditor expect multiple transactions and possible adjustments
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of fees and charges) or by adjusting their rates and fees just enough to avoid HOEPA’s
reach (for example, fees of 7.99%). Many of the more aggressive state predatory lending
statutes build on the framework of HOEPA but set lower triggers in order to regulate a
greater proportion of mortgages.
A few other federal statutes have some impact, but even less than the three
discussed above, on subprime and predatory lending. Some mortgage borrowers may
have remedies pursuant to the Fair Housing Act of 1968 and/or the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act of 1976. The Fair Housing Act prohibits intentional discrimination
against protected classes in connection with the renting or selling of residential real
estate. Similarly, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act prohibits discrimination against
protected classes in credit transactions, including mortgage transactions. Because of the
difficulty proving discrimination claims and the statutes’ limited damage remedies, they
have not had much of an impact.
4. Federal Regulatory Responses
Federal regulators have limited jurisdiction over the subprime market. The
Department of Housing and Urban Development (a Cabinet-level agency) enforces the
Fair Housing Act and RESPA, but has not actively sought to enforce these laws against
subprime lenders. The Federal Trade Commission (or FTC, an independent agency
established in part to enforce consumer protection laws) brought a number of actions
against subprime lenders alleging unfair and deceptive trade practices pursuant the
Federal Trade Commission Act. While not insignificant, these cases did not lead to any
fundamental changes in the subprime market. The FTC has also exercised its authority to
abrogate the holder in due course doctrine for some home improvement loans which were
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made or originated by home improvement contractors. While this has been a relatively
small sector of the subprime market, it has also been one that is rife with abusive
practices.
The Office of the Comptroller of Currency (a bureau of the Department of the
Treasury that charters, regulates and supervises national banks); the Office of Thrift
Supervision (a bureau of the Department of the Treasury that is the primary regulator of
all federal and many state-chartered thrift institutions); the National Credit Union
Association (the independent federal agency that charters and supervises federal credit
unions); and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (the independent agency that
regulates and insures deposits of certain banks and thrifts) have all alerted the institutions
that they regulate of the problems in the subprime sector. These agencies have not,
however, had much impact on that sector because so many subprime mortgages were
originated by lenders that were not supervised by any of those federal regulators.
Moreover, during the subprime boom of the 2000s, the Bush Administration and
the regulators it appointed actively opposed increased consumer protection regulation of
lenders and moved to preempt attempts by the states to implement such regulation as
well. For instance, the OCC actively sought to preempt attempts by states to increase
consumer protection regulation. In Watters v. Wachovia, 550 U.S. 1 (2007), the Supreme
Court adopted the OCC’s position that state banking officials could not regulate operating
subsidiaries of national banks that would have otherwise been subject to such regulation.
Nor did the Federal Reserve Board, which Congress had charged with
implementing HOEPA, make a significant dent in abusive lending in the subprime sector.
Indeed, Alan Greenspan, the Chairman of the Board during the subprime boom, made it
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clear that the Board would not pursue a meaningful consumer protection agenda during
his tenure as it would be inconsistent with his broader deregulatory agenda. Under
Chairman Benjamin Bernanke, the Board has issued final regulations (revising
Regulation Z, which implements TILA) adopted pursuant to HOEPA that are intended to
increase borrower protections from abusive lending practices. The new regulations limit
various acts and practices in mortgage loans with APRs exceeding a new, lower trigger.
The new interest rate trigger is anything higher than one and one half percentage points
more than the average prime offer rate established by the Board for a first lien loan and
three and a half percentage points for a subordinate lien loan. The new regulations,
among other things, limit for loans meeting these lower triggers (i) lending without
considering borrower’s ability to pay and (ii) prepayment penalties. These new
regulations will take effect on Oct. 1, 2009.
5. State Legislative Responses
Before the federal government made it clear that it would move to preempt them,
many states enacted predatory lending legislation that sought to curb the worst excesses
of the subprime sector. North Carolina enacted the first state predatory lending law on
July 22, 1999, effective July 21, 2000. The North Carolina law is closely modeled on
HOEPA, but with lower triggers and more stringent consumer protections.
Many other states enacted similar legislation over the following few years. They
often set APR triggers in the 5%-6% range and lowered points and fees triggers. Some
states also implemented various prohibitions for high cost loans such as no negative
amortization; no balloon payments; no due on demand clauses; no prepaid payments; no
default interest rates; no direct payments to home improvement contractors (a common

12
David Reiss, Brooklyn Law School

INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HOUSING AND HOME
Draft Entry on

Regulation of Subprime and Predatory Lending

problem in the early 2000s in which borrowers were bypassed completely in the flow of
funds from the lender to the contractor); and various additional mandatory disclosures
relating to the terms of the loan and the mortgage origination process. State statutes also
abrogated the holder in due course doctrine in certain circumstances for high cost loans.
The Watters v. Wachovia, 550 U.S. 1 (2007) decision took the steam out of the
states’ consumer protection movement as these predatory lending laws could be bypassed
by operating subsidiaries of national banks that had been, pre-Watters, regulated by the
states. Not only did the existing operating subsidiaries originate a sizable number of
subprime loans, but now other state-regulated lenders would be incentivized to sell
themselves to national banks in order to avoid the more stringent state regulation that was
enacted throughout the early 2000s.
Like the FTC, various state Attorneys General brought some significant cases
against abusive subprime lenders, some of which led to big settlements and major
changes in the practices of the individual companies. But again like the FTC, these cases
did not meaningfully resolve the pervasive abusive practices found throughout the
subprime sector.
6. Conclusion
The bust of the subprime market in the mid-2000s led to the global financial crisis
of the late 2000s. This crisis has virtually ended subprime lending for the current credit
cycle. Most subprime lenders have gone out of business or merged with other financial
institutions. The remaining financial institutions have tightened their underwriting so that
they no longer lend to those with subprime credit profiles. It is likely, however, that
subprime lending will return in some form once the credit cycle turns. Other than the
recent amendments to Regulation Z, the regulation of subprime and predatory lending has
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not changed in any meaningful way since the peak of the subprime boom. For the cycle
of abusive lending to be ameliorated once credit standards inevitably loosen, the federal
government will need to further expand consumer protection regulation or allow the
states to do so.
*
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